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Economic globalization and international economic governance have spurred 
a more intense dialogue and interaction among nations – potentially 
promoting cultural diversity and providing the funds to recover and preserve 
cultural heritage. However, these phenomena can also jeopardize cultural 
heritage. Foreign direct investments in the extraction of natural resources 
have the ultimate capacity to change cultural landscapes and erase memory; 
trade in cultural goods can induce cultural homogenization. In parallel, 
legally binding and highly effective regimes demand states to promote and 
facilitate foreign direct investment and free trade.  
This article investigates the distinct interplay between the promotion of 
economic integration and the protection of cultural heritage before two 
separate international dispute resolution systems: i.e. investment treaty 
arbitral tribunals and the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism. It addresses the question as to whether international economic 
‘courts’ pay adequate attention to the need of protecting cultural heritage, 
contributing to the coalescence of consistent narratives and emerging general 
principles of law. Has a cultural administrative law emerged requiring the 
protection of cultural heritage and an adequate balance between the same and 
the promotion of economic interests in international law? Are there specific 
contributions arising from each of the two dispute settlement mechanisms? 
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I.    Introduction 
      
Cultural heritage is a multifaceted concept which includes both tangible (i.e. 
monuments, sites, cultural landscapes etc.), and intangible cultural resources 
(i.e., music, cultural practices, food preparation etc.). While culture represents 
inherited values, ideas, and traditions, which characterize social groups and 
their behaviour, heritage indicates something to be cherished and handed 
down from one generation to another. There is no single definition of cultural 
heritage at the international law level; rather different legal instruments 
provide ad hoc definitions often focusing on distinct categories of cultural 
heritage – i.e., intangible cultural heritage, and underwater cultural heritage – 
rather than approaching it holistically.
2
  
    The protection of cultural heritage is a fundamental public interest. 
Cultural heritage is perceived as a strategic resource of sustainable 
development that is, development which meets the needs of the present and 
future generations. It can be an engine of economic growth and welfare, being 
central in people’s lives, enriching their existence in both a material and 
immaterial sense.
3
 Cultural exchanges create the conditions for renewed 
dialogue among civilizations. Respect for the diversity of cultures is deemed 
to be among the best guarantees of international peace and security.4  
Economic globalization and international economic governance have 
spurred a more intense dialogue and interaction among nations – potentially 
promoting cultural diversity and providing the funds to recover and preserve 
cultural heritage. The expansion of trade and foreign investment facilitates 
the interaction between different cultures and development may be conceived 
as a process for expanding cultural freedom.
5
 As a result, there can be 
positive synergies between the promotion of trade and foreign direct 
investment on the one hand and the protection of cultural heritage on the 
other. 
However, this is not always the case. Economic globalization and 
international economic governance can also jeopardize cultural heritage. 
Asymmetry in flows and exchanges of cultural goods can lead to cultural 
homogenization. In parallel, investments in the extractive industries have the 
ultimate capacity of changing cultural landscapes. At the same time, legally 
binding and highly effective regimes demand states to promote foreign direct 
investments and free trade.  
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The privileged regime created by international economic law within the 
boundaries of the host state has increasingly determined a tension between 
the promotion of economic integration and cultural sovereignty, meant as the 
regulatory autonomy of the host state in the cultural field. Trading nations 
and investors have increasingly claimed that cultural policies breach 
international economic law provisions. In particular, they have alleged 
violation of the Most Favored Nation Treatment (MFN), national treatment, 
ban on performance requirements, and others. International disputes relating 
to the interplay between cultural heritage and economic integration are 
characterized by the need to balance the interests of a state to adopt cultural 
policies on the one hand, and the economic interests of investors and traders 
on the other. Trading nations and investors have brought claims before two 
separate international dispute resolution systems: the World Trade 
Organization (WTO)
6
 dispute settlement mechanism and investment treaty 
arbitral tribunals respectively. For the purpose of this discussion, these two 
systems are examined in parallel. Arbitral tribunals and WTO dispute 
settlement panels essentially do share the same functions by settling 
international disputes in accordance with parallel subsets of international 
economic law. Like WTO panels and the Appellate Body, arbitral tribunals 
are asked to strike a balance between economic and non-economic concerns. 
On the other hand, certain international trade treaties present an articulated 
regime that the investment treaties presuppose. For instance, there is some 
coincidence in the subject matter of investment treaties and the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS Agreement).
7
 However, this 
does not mean that these two systems should be treated as the same. Rather, 
their differences ought to be recognized. While only states can file claims 
before the WTO panels and the Appellate Body, investor–state arbitration can 
be pursued by foreign investors directly without any intervention of the home 
state. Furthermore, arbitral tribunals can authorize damages to the foreign 
investors, while remedies at the WTO only have prospective character and 
involve states only. Moreover, there may be specific contributions arising 
from each of the two systems. 
Let us consider some examples. Indigenous hunting practices constitute a 
form of intangible cultural heritage deemed essential to preserve indigenous 
way of life. As Europeans perceive the hunting of seals to be morally 
objectionable, the European Union (EU) has banned the trade in seal products 
except those derived from hunts traditionally conducted by the Inuit and other 
indigenous communities for cultural and subsistence reasons.
8
 Canada and 
Norway brought the seal ban before the WTO, contending that the ban 
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violated relevant trade obligations. Is the indigenous exemption in conformity 
with relevant international economic law obligations?  
In another dispute, a US company filed an investment treaty arbitration 
against Ukraine because the state required that 50 per cent of the general 
broadcasting of each radio company should be Ukrainian music. The claimant 
argued that the local music requirement breached the investment treaty 
provision prohibiting the state from imposing foreign companies to buy local 
goods. The claimant also contended that: ‘We should allow the audience to 
determine what it wants and we think that since Ukraine is seeking the status 
of a country with a market-economy, it should not introduce Ukrainian 
culture by force…’.9 Is the local music requirement a breach of the ban on 
performance requirements? Is it justified on public policy grounds as part of 
the state’s legitimate right to preserve cultural inheritance?10 The Arbitral 
Tribunal held that the condition of the bidding process ‘was a legitimate 
decision, based on a public interest choice to extend the use of Ukrainian in 
the media’ arguably contributing to the diffusion of Ukrainian culture.11  
The clash between the protection of cultural heritage and economic 
globalization constitutes a special case of the more general tug-of-war 
between the state regulatory autonomy and international business concerns.
12
 
This tension is similar to, but also differs from, other tensions, such as those 
between economic globalization on the one hand and public health and 
environmental protection on the other. In fact, the protection of cultural 
heritage is qualified, being subject to both internal and external limits. 
Internal limits require preventing an overprotection of cultural heritage and 
respecting cultural freedom. Because culture is a fluid concept, it should not 
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be frozen in time. External limits to the protection of cultural heritage are 
posed by the respect of fundamental human rights. Only cultural policies and 




Moreover, notwithstanding a growing regulation of the field, international 
cultural law remains vague. For instance, the Convention on Cultural 
Diversity requires the protection of cultural diversity, but it does not offer 
detailed rules.
14
 Furthermore, the measures adopted by the state parties to 
comply with the Convention can be contradictory. Consider the Lemire case. 
Would cultural diversity be better promoted by allowing the foreign company 
to transmit foreign songs or by requiring the compulsory broadcasting of 
national music? In casu, the Arbitral Tribunal upheld the Respondent’s 
argument that the broadcasting of music in a national language was an 
important element of cultural sovereignty. The indefinite fluidity of 
international cultural law allows states to calibrate their cultural policies 
according to their specific needs. It can also assist the achievement of a 
suitable balance between the protection of cultural heritage and the promotion 
of economic interests in international law. Yet, concerns remain that cultural 
policies can disguise discrimination and protectionism. The particular fluidity 
of international cultural law can make it difficult for adjudicators to ascertain 
the legitimacy of such measures.  
Because there is no ‘World Heritage Court’, cultural heritage related 
disputes have been attracted and settled by international economic fora. The 
WTO panels, the Appellate Body and arbitral tribunals scrutinise cultural 
policies to determine whether the latter are enacted in the public interest or 
for protectionist purposes and whether the state has struck a proper balance 
between the means employed and the aim sought to be realized. Given the 
significant and consistently increasing number of international economic 
disputes which present cultural elements due to ever increasing economic 
integration, the interaction between the protection of cultural heritage and 
economic globalization deserves further scrutiny.
15
  
When should economic interests yield to the protection of cultural heritage? 
At their core, cultural heritage related disputes involve society’s most 
cherished values that are definitive of a nation’s identity. The protection of 
cultural heritage can be thought of as a public interest in terms of the interest 
of the state, but it also encapsulates the common interest of mankind – 
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transcending borders and stressing the common bonds which link the 
international community as a whole.
16
 At the same time, economic freedoms 
can also promote the free flow of ideas, cultural diversity and equality of 
opportunities, as well as social and economic welfare.
17
  
The review by an international tribunal of domestic regulations can improve 
good cultural governance and the transparent pursuit of legitimate cultural 
policies. Most governments will have to consider the impact of cultural 
policies on foreign investment and international trade before the enactment of 
such measures to avoid potential claims and subsequent liability. Whether 
this may cause a regulatory chill is a matter of debate.  
On the other hand, the interaction between international economic law and 
other sets of law raises the question as to whether the former is a ‘self-
contained’ system.18 The increased proliferation of treaties and specialization 
of different branches of international law make some overlapping between the 
latter unavoidable. General treaty rules on hierarchy—namely lex posterior 
derogat priori
19
 and lex specialis derogat generali—20 may not be wholly 
adequate to govern the interplay between treaty regimes because the given 




Moreover, when adjudicating cultural heritage related economic disputes, 
the question arises as to whether international economic courts can take into 
account and/or apply other bodies of law in addition to international 
economic law. Investment treaty arbitral tribunals and the WTO panels and 
Appellate Body are of limited jurisdiction and cannot adjudicate on the 
eventual violation of cultural heritage law. Yet, when interpreting a treaty 
they can take account of other international obligations of the parties 
according to customary rules of treaty interpretation as restated by the Vienna 
                                                 
16
 Francesco Francioni, ‘Public and Private in the International Protection of Global Cultural 
Goods’, 23 European Journal of International Law 719 (2012) at 719 ff (considering the 
protection of cultural heritage as a global public good.). 
17
 Petros C. Mavroidis, ‘Free Lunches? WTO as Public Good, and the WTO’s View of Public 
Goods’, 23 European Journal of International Law 731 (2012), at 731 ff.; Barnali Choudhuri, 
‘International Investment Law as a Global Public Good’, 17 Lewis & Clark Law Review 481 
(2013) 481 ff (considering the promotion of trade and foreign direct investments as public 
goods)  
18
 Joel P. Trachtman, ‘The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution’, 40 Harvard International 
Law Journal 333 (1999) 333 ff.; Pauwelyn, above n 11. 
19
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), opened for signature 23 May 1969, in 
force 27 January 1980, 1155 UNTS 331, Article 30, 
20
 The concept lex specialis derogat legi generali is ‘a generally accepted technique of 
interpretation and conflict resolution in international law’. It indicates that ‘whenever two or 
more norms deal with the same subject matter, priority should be given to the norm that is 
more specific’. See Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law, adopted by the International Law Commission at its Fifty-eighth session, 
in 2006, and submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report 
covering the work of that session (A/61/10, para. 251), at p. 2. 
21
 Donald McRae, ‘International Economic Law and Public International Law: The Past and 
the Future’, 17 Journal of International Economic Law 627 (2014) at 635.  
  7 
Convention on Law of Treaties (VCLT).
22
 That is how the cultural 
international obligations of states can be considered in the adjudication of 
disputes before international economic ‘courts’. Nonetheless, the relevant 
UNESCO instruments do not set out a hierarchical relationship between 
international cultural law and other components of public international law.
23
 
Unless a cultural norms constitutes jus cogens,
24
 it is difficult to foresee and 
to govern the interaction of different legal regimes.  
Given their institutional mandate that is to settle trade and investment 
disputes, there is a risk that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and 
investment treaty tribunals respectively water down or overlook noteworthy 
cultural aspects. International adjudicators may be perceived as detached 
from local communities and their cultural concerns. They may not have 
specific expertise in cultural heritage law as their appointment requires 
expertise in international (economic) law. Furthermore, due to the emergence 
of a jurisprudence constante in international trade and investment law 
respectively, there is a risk that tribunals do conform to these de facto 
precedents without necessarily considering analogous cultural heritage related 
cases adjudicated before other international courts and tribunals. This is not to 
say that consistency in decision-making is undesirable; obviously it can 
enhance the coherence and predictability of the system contributing to its 
legitimacy. Yet, the selection of the relevant precedents matters as it can have 
an impact on the decision.  
Have international economic fora paid any attention to cultural heritage? 
Are they imposing standards of good cultural governance, by adopting 
general administrative law principles, such as proportionality, due process, 
reasonableness and others? The critical assessment of such jurisprudence is a 
fertile endeavour as it may help in detecting common patterns, leading to the 
coalescence of general principles of law and/or customary law requiring an 
equilibrate balance between the protection of cultural heritage and the 
protection of economic interests in international law.    
This article proceeds as follows. First, it highlights the main features of 
cultural heritage law. Second, the different types of cultural heritage related 
disputes are highlighted. Third, the article investigates  whether investment 
treaty tribunals and WTO panels and AB are contributing to the emergence of 
general principles of law requiring the protection of cultural heritage. Finally 
some conclusions will be drawn. 
 
 
II.    Towards a Multipolar Cultural Law 
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Cultural governance – meant as the multi-level and multi-polar regulation of 
cultural heritage – has emerged as a new frontier of study and has come to the 
forefront of legal debate.
25
 Cultural governance constitutes a good example of 
legal pluralism as a multiplicity of different bodies govern cultural heritage at 
national, regional and international levels.
26
 While states maintain primary 
responsibilities in the cultural field, other actors have come to play an 
important role with regard to cultural heritage, ranging from international 
administrative bodies to private actors; from national courts and tribunals to 
international economic fora.  
Two dualisms traditionally characterized cultural heritage law:
27
 the 
distinction between public law and private law on the one hand and the 
division between domestic and international law on the other. However, these 
traditional boundaries have become blurry in contemporary cultural heritage 
law, as both private and public traits and national and international 
dimensions constantly interact in several different ways. Cultural law has 
been increasingly regulated at the national and international level by both 
public and private actors. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
28
 has played a leading role in the making 
of cultural law. It has produced conventions, non-binding (but influential and 
morally suasive) declarations, and guidelines which have gradually extended 
the scope of cultural heritage law. These instruments have raised awareness 
of the importance of heritage protection and spurred the development of 
domestic cultural policies.
29
 Private actors have been active in governing 
aspects of international cultural law too.
30
 All of these instruments channel 
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cultural concerns into the fabric of international law and influence policy 
making and adjudication, due to their almost global ratification. 
While private actors often file claims against states, cultural heritage related 
disputes may well constitute inter-state disputes. For instance, foreign 
investors can (and have) file(d) claims against the host state alleging that 
cultural policies adopted by the latter amount to a disguised discrimination of 
their investment or other breaches of investment treaty provisions. The 
cultural interests at stake may present a complexity unknown in other areas of 
the law, presenting a mixture of private and public interests which at times 
coincide (i.e., in which case, requiring the protection of the cultural item), and 




There is a sort of mimesis and dialectic between the private and public 
dimensions of cultural law. On the one hand, there is an increasing awareness 
that cultural resources require public intervention and due to the existence of 
undeniable public interests. On the other hand, public law looks to private law 
in order to learn from its arguments, dispute settlement mechanisms and so 
on. Private funding is also needed to recover and protect cultural heritage.  
In parallel, there is a sort of mimesis and dialectic between the local and 
global dimension of cultural governance. Global governance favors experts 
over non-experts. Under global cultural governance, decision-making 
processes tend to be elitist and opaque and express top-down approaches. 
Such approaches may not necessarily be responsive to local needs. The need 
to humanize cultural heritage law has been advocated by human rights bodies, 
which condemned the forced eviction of local communities from heritage 
sites.
32
 Local governance on the other hand, may emphasize local needs 
including those of economic growth which, in certain cases, may sensibly 
diverge from international standards.  
The different approaches to the conservation of cultural heritage are 
well reflected in the traditional debate between nationalists and 
internationalists in cultural heritage law.
33
 While internationalists perceive 
cultural heritage as expressing a common human culture, wherever its place 
and location, nationalists perceive it as part of the national culture.
34
 Even 
assuming that relevant UNESCO Conventions incorporate a mixture of both 
approaches, as it has been persuasively argued,
35
 questions remain in those 
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cases in which the two interests – internationalist and nationalist – diverge. 
Which interest should prevail in the management of cultural heritage: the 
interest of the locals or the interests of the international community? Often 
the two interests coincide. Both communities have an interest in the 
conservation of cultural heritage. However, when interests collide, national 
authorities (and adjudicators) face the dilemma as to whether to comply with 
international law or to accord to the preferences of the local constituencies. 
Of further interest is the question how this overlapping or collision of 
interests relates to the admission and operation of trade and foreign 
investments. Is there any difference in using the local public interest or the 
global interest as a parameter in the interpretation of international economic 
law and the adjudication of the relevant disputes? 
 
 
III.    Cultural Heritage Related Disputes 
 
Cultural heritage related conflicts of an economic type arise when the 
protection of cultural heritage affects the economic interests of traders and 
investors. The conservation of cultural heritage has a relatively stable nucleus 
which forbids and/or limits categories of economic activities which easily 
conflict with heritage management.
36
 For instance, mining or oil and gas 
development threaten more than one-quarter of all cultural heritage sites.
37
 
However, moving from the core of cultural heritage protection to its 
periphery, conservation policies may become more nuanced and contested. 
Heritage policy discourse is varied; preservation policies are not uniform and 




Cultural heritage disputes can be classified as cultural heritage disputes in a 
narrow sense, or cultural heritage disputes in the broad sense. The former 
center on the destiny of a given cultural artefact. The latter deal with cultural 
heritage only tangentially. For instance, there are situations where the cultural 
object is not the petitum (subject matter) or the causa petendi (cause of 
action) of a given dispute but rather an action against the cultural object is 
undertaken in order to enforce other judgments or arbitral awards related to 
the most diverse circumstances including damages for dismissed foreign 
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investments.
39
 Cultural heritage disputes in the broad sense relate to cultural 
heritage in an oblique or indirect fashion. Nonetheless, due to their possible 
consequences for the destiny of the relevant cultural heritage, such cases 
deserve further scrutiny from a cultural law perspective as they tend to be 
investigated almost exclusively from the perspectives of other branches of 
law including international economic law.  
Cultural heritage disputes have been adjudicated through a variety of 
mechanisms including diplomatic efforts, negotiations, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration and judicial proceedings.
40
 Given the structural 
imbalance between the vague and non-binding dispute settlement 
mechanisms provided by international cultural law and the highly effective 
and sophisticated dispute settlement mechanisms available under 
international economic law, cultural heritage disputes involving investors’ or 
traders’ rights have often been brought before international economic fora. 
Obviously, this does not mean that these are the only available tribunals, let 
alone the superior tribunals for this kind of dispute. Other fora are available 
such as national courts, human rights courts, regional economic courts and 
the traditional state-to-state fora such as the International Court of Justice or 
even inter-state arbitration. Given its scope, this study focuses on the 
jurisprudence of the WTO bodies and arbitral tribunals. Are arbitral tribunals, 
the WTO panels and the AB the appropriate fora to resolve such cases? Some 
scholars consider that arbitral tribunals, WTO panels and the AB make policy 
trade-offs in the way that other tribunals do, contributing to the development 
of international law. Other scholars, however, contend that the role of 
international economic courts is that of interpreting and applying 
international economic law, rather than making law, regarding the latter as 
the role for legislators.  
This section explores a selected sample of cultural heritage related 
international economic disputes,
41
 to investigate the question as to whether 




Since European citizens perceive seal hunting as cruel, because of the means 
through which the seals are hunted, the EU adopted a comprehensive regime 
governing seal products.
42
 The EU seal regime prohibits the importation and 
sale in the EU of any seal product except: (a) those derived from hunting 
conducted in a traditional fashion by Inuit and other indigenous communities 
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and which contribute to their subsistence;
43
 and (b) those that are by-products 
of a hunt regulated by national law and with the sole purpose of sustainable 
management of marine resources.
44
 In addition, seal products for personal use 
may be imported but may not be placed on the market.
45
 The EU allowed the 
exception for indigenous hunt because of the international law commitments 




Canada and Norway brought claims against the EU before the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body arguing, inter alia, that the indigenous communities 
condition (IC condition) and the marine resource management condition 
(MRM condition) violated the non-discrimination obligation under Article I:1 
and III:4 of the GATT 1994.
47
 According to Canada and Norway, such 
conditions accord seal products from Canada and Norway treatment less 
favourable than that accorded to like seal products of domestic origin, mainly 
from Sweden and Finland as well as those of other foreign origin, in 
particular from Greenland.
48
 In fact, the majority of seals hunted in Canada 
and Norway would not qualify under the exceptions, ‘while most if not all of 
Greenlandic seal products are expected to conform to the requirements under 
the IC exception…’.49 Therefore, according to the complainants, the regime 
would de facto discriminate against Canadian and Norwegian imports of seal 
products,
50
 as it would restrict virtually all trade in seal products from Canada 
and Norway within the EU.
51
 Moreover, the complainants argued that while 
the EU measures did not prevent products derived from seals killed 
inhumanely from being sold on the EU market,
52
 they could prevent products 




The panel found that the seal products produced by indigenous peoples and 
those not hunted by indigenous peoples were like products.
54
 The panel 
acknowledged the existence of a number of international law instruments, 
including the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
focusing on the preservation of cultural heritage.
55
 The panel also referred to 
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45
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a number of WTO countries adopting analogous Inuit exceptions.
56
 These 
sources were taken into account as ‘factual evidence’.57 Despite the reference 
to these instruments, however, the panel concluded that the design and 
application of the IC measure was not even-handed because the IC exception 
was available de facto to Greenland.
58
 Therefore, the panel held, inter alia, 
that the exception provided for indigenous communities under the EU Seal 
Regime accorded more favourable treatment to seal products produced by 
indigenous communities than that accorded to like domestic and foreign 
products.
59
 The panel concluded that the same exception, inter alia, violated 
Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994 because an advantage granted by the 
EU to seal products derived from hunts traditionally conducted by the Inuit 




Finally, the panel examined the question as to whether the seal products 
regulation was justified under any of the exceptions under Article XX of the 
GATT 1994, and in particular under Article XX(a) on public morals. The 
panel noted that ‘animal welfare is an issue of ethical or moral nature in the 
European Union’.61 Therefore the panel found that the EU seal regime was 
necessary to protect public morals. Yet, it determined that the regime had a 
discriminatory impact that could not be justified under the chapeau of Article 
Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994.
62
  
Immediately after the release of the reports, Canada, Norway and the EU 
each appealed certain legal interpretations developed in the panel reports. The 
Appellate Body inter alia confirmed that the EU seal regime de facto 
discriminated like products under Articles I:1 (Most Favored Nation) and 
III:4 (National Tratment) of the GATT 1994. The AB also confirmed that the 
ban on seal products can be justified on moral grounds under GATT Article 
XX(a). However, it held the regime did not meet the requirements of the 
chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994, criticising the way the exception 
for Inuit hunts has been designed and implemented.
63
 Inter alia, the AB noted 
that the IC exception contained no anti-circumvention clause,
64
 and 
pinpointed that ‘seal products derived from …commercial hunts could 
potentially enter the EU market under the IC exception’.65 The AB concluded 
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Therefore, the EU will have to refine the seal regime to demonstrate good 
faith, insert anti-circumvention rules and thus comply with the chapeau 
requirements. Ultimately, the flaws found by the panel and AB were not with 
the ban itself, but with the specific implementation of the ban’s exception for 
indigenous peoples.  
In Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania,
67
 Parkerings, a 
Norwegian enterprise, filed a claim before an ICSID Tribunal, claiming that 
Lithuania breached the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause as a result of 
allegedly preferential treatment to a Dutch competitor.
68
 Parkerings had 
concluded an agreement with the Municipality of Vilnius (Lithuania) for the 
construction of parking facilities.
69
 Because of technical difficulties and the 
growing public opposition due to the cultural impact of the investor’s project 
on the city’s Old Town – a world heritage site – the municipality terminated 
the agreement and subsequently signed another contract with a Dutch 
company for the completion of the project. The successful contractor would 
not excavate under the Old Town.
70
  
The Tribunal dismissed this claim, finding that Parkerings and the Dutch 
competitor were not in like circumstances.
71
 The project presented by 
Parkerings included excavation works under the Cathedral.
72
 Not only did the 
Tribunal pay due attention to cultural heritage matters, but it also stated that 
compliance with the obligations flowing from the World Heritage Convention 
(WHC)
73
 justified the refusal of the project,
74
 holding that ‘The historical and 
archaeological preservation and environmental protection could be, and in 
this case were, a justification for the refusal of the [claimant’s] project’.75 
While the Tribunal did not mention any hierarchy among different 
international law obligations, it concretely balanced the different norms.  
The Tribunal also noted that circumstances in a country in transition could 
not justify legitimate expectations with regard to the stability of the 
investment environment
76
 and that legislative changes may be seen as a 
normal business risk (in this case due to the transition from a former Soviet 
Union state to candidate to EU membership). Nonetheless, this does not 
exempt states from a general duty of good faith and transparency. In casu, the 
Tribunal admitted that: ‘Even if no violation of the BIT or international law 
occurred, the conduct of the city of Vilnius was far from being without 
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criticism.’77 Therefore, the Arbitral Tribunal dismissed all the claims in their 




B. Interpretation and the Applicable Law 
 
The cases Border Timbers Limited and others v. Republic of Zimbabwe,
79
 and 
Bernhard von Pezold and others v. Republic of Zimbabwe,
80
 concern 
plantations in Zimbabwe, owned by foreign investors and compulsorily 
acquired by the government of Zimbabwe as part of its land reform 
programme. The Claimants allege unlawful expropriation of their properties.  
An NGO and four indigenous communities requested the permission to file a 
written submission as amicus curiae to the Arbitral Tribunals.
81
 Allegedly, 
the plantations are located on the ancestral territories of indigenous peoples.
82
 
The indigenous communities submitted that ‘the outcome of the present 
arbitral proceedings w[ould] determine not only the future rights and 
obligations of the disputing parties with regard to these lands, but m[ight] 
also potentially impact on the indigenous communities’ collective and 
individual rights’.83 The petitioners argued that ‘international human rights 
law on indigenous peoples applies to these arbitrations in parallel to the 
relevant BITs and the ICSID Convention’.84 According to the petitioners, 
‘Arbitral Tribunals’ mandate derives from “powers delegated to it by 
Contracting Parties with concrete human rights obligations under 
international law”.85  
    The claimants objected to the submissions, alleging the petitioners’ lack of 
independence. They noted that while their titles had ‘never been subject to, or 
conditional on, the claims of the indigenous communities’, they had ‘always 
acknowledged that some parts of the Border Estate are of particular cultural 
significance to those communities’, and ‘therefore granted access to those 
parts of the Estate to the communities.
86
 The claimants also argued that 
‘reference to “international law” in the applicable BITs does not mean that 
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the whole body of substantive international law is applicable’.87 On its part, 
the Respondent had no objection to the NGO being allowed to make 
submissions ‘provided they … do not impinge on or amount to a challenge to 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Zimbabwe’.88 
On 26 June 2012, the Tribunal rejected the petition.
89
 Despite 
acknowledging that the indigenous tribes have ‘some interest in the land over 
which the Claimants assert full legal title’, and that ‘it may therefore well be 
that the determinations of the Arbitral Tribunals in these proceedings will 
have an impact on the interests of the indigenous communities’,90 the 
Tribunal held that the ‘apparent lack of independence or neutrality of the 
petitioners [wa]s a sufficient ground for denying the application’.91  
Moreover, the Tribunal agreed with the Claimants that the applicable law 
‘does not incorporate the universe of international law into the BITs or into 
disputes arising under the BITs’.92 Since neither Party put the identity and/or 
treatment of the indigenous communities under international law in issue in 
the proceedings,
93
 the Tribunal considered that the matter felt outside the 
scope of the dispute as it was constituted.
94
 The Tribunal added that ‘Whether 
or not the proposed … submission would have the effect of impinging on the 
Respondent’s territorial sovereignty is unclear’.95  The Tribunal also stated 
that ‘the Petitioners provided no evidence or support for their assertion that 
international investment law and international human rights law are 
interdependent such that any decision of these Arbitral Tribunals which did 
not consider the content of international human rights norms would be legally 
incomplete’.96 This seems an infelicitous statement, which relates to the 
notorious debate as to whether iura novit curia applies to international 
investment arbitration. International investment treaties and the ICSID 
Convention do not specifically provide for this principle. Yet, a few arbitral 
tribunals and ICSID Annulment Committees have held that this principle 
applies to investment treaty arbitration
97
 and scholars have similarly 
advocated its use in this context.
98
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Other arbitral tribunals, however, have referred to the relevant international 
instruments and took them into account. For instance, in the notorious 
Pyramids case, which involved the denial of a construction project in front of 
the Pyramids for understandable cultural reasons, loss of profits was not 
awarded because of the unlawfulness of the proposed economic activity under 
cultural heritage law.
99
 Notwithstanding the previous approval of the 
investment at stake, Egypt cancelled the contract and the area was added to 
the World Heritage List. The ICSID Tribunal noted that the site had been 
added to the List after the cancellation of the project. Therefore, it found 
contractual liability and sustained the claimants’ argument that the particular 
public purpose of the expropriation could not change the obligation to pay 
fair compensation. However, it reduced the amount of such award (or 
payment), stating that only the actual damage (damnum emergens), and not 
the loss of profit (lucrum cessans), could be compensated.
100
 Indeed, it stated: 
‘sales in the areas registered with the World Heritage Committee under the 
UNESCO Convention would have been illegal under […] international law 
[…] [T]he allowance of lucrum cessans may only involve those profits which 
are legitimate.’101  
In the Glamis Gold case, which concerned the development of a gold mine 
in Southern California, the fact that the US is a party to the WHC was of 
relevance; the arbitrators took the WHC into account when considering the 
protection that the US afforded to indigenous cultural heritage, citing Article 
12 of the WHC which refers to the protection of cultural heritage sites that are 
not listed on the World Heritage List. The Tribunal pointed out: ‘The 
Convention makes special note that the fact of a site’s non-inclusion on the 
register does not signify its failure to possess “outstanding universal 
value”.102 
     
 
IV. Critical Assessment: A Clash of Cultures? 
 
Like ‘castles of crossed destinies’,103 international economic courts have 
attracted a number of ‘culture and trade’ and ‘culture and investment’ related 
disputes. In these disputes brought before the WTO and arbitral tribunals 
respectively, the arguments in support of free trade and foreign direct 
investment are intertwined with cultural heritage claims. The case studies 
analysed here epitomize the clash between international economic law and 
state sovereignty. These cases also show that there may be both synergy and 
collision between economic interests and the protection of cultural heritage. 
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On the one hand, the seal products dispute shows that free trade can enhance 
indigenous peoples’ cultural practices, and that trade can be a mechanism of 
economic subsistence and cultural empowerment.  
    Yet, there is a friction between the non–discrimination principle, as applied 
in international trade law, and positive measures, i.e. those exceptions or 
measures adopted by States to protect specific sectors of society. In parallel, 
the interplay between international investment law and cultural entitlements 
presents mixed outcomes. On the one hand, when respondent states have used 
cultural heritage arguments in their pleadings, these have been taken into 
account by adjudicators. International economic fora do refer to cultural 
heritage not because of its intrinsic value. Rather, they have taken it into 
account when the host state connected the protection of cultural heritage to 
state sovereignty and the public interest. On the other hand, when the parties 
make no reference to cultural arguments, the arbitral tribunals have tended to 
consider such claims as outside the subject matter of the dispute. If arbitral 
tribunals went beyond their mandate, their award could be annulled.  
Are the WTO adjudicative bodies and investment treaty tribunals operating 
as open, rather than self-contained, regimes under public international law? 
Some scholars and practitioners have pinpointed that ‘trade and other societal 
values incorporated in the WTO framework ought to be recognized as equals; 
a liberal trade bias to interpret each and every rule in the WTO package is to 
be excluded.’104 Similar arguments have been made in the context of 
investment treaty arbitration, highlighting that ‘excessive 
compartmentalization impedes coherence; it emphasizes the particular over 
the universal; it may defeat important policy objectives of the international 
community by leading to competition and clashes between regimes.’105 
Neither the WTO or international investment governance are ‘mono-
cultures’;106 rather they deal with a variety of issues and sectors. Moreover, 
customary canons of treaty interpretation require systematic interpretation.
107
    
At a procedural level, the arguments of local communities, including 
indigenous peoples, can (and sometimes have) be(en) espoused by their home 
government. While local communities can (and have) present(ed) amicus 
curiae briefs reflecting their specific interests, arbitral tribunals, WTO panels 
and the Appellate Body are not legally obliged to consider such briefs – 
rather they have the capacity to do so should they deem it appropriate. There 
may be legitimate reasons for declining to consider such briefs, for instance if 
the applicants are not independent or raise legal issues which had not been 
raised by the parties and are outside the scope of the dispute. 
More substantively, international economic fora are tribunals of limited 
jurisdiction and cannot adjudicate on eventual infringements of cultural 
                                                 
104
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heritage law. Arbitral tribunals, WTO panels and the AB are not deciding 
whether cultural heritage is protected or not. Rather, they are ascertaining 
different matters. In particular, arbitral tribunals assess whether there is a 
breach of the relevant investment treaty provisions.. If there is expropriation, 
compensation must be paid, irrespective of the public policy objective 
pursued by the state.
108
 The Lemire Tribunal found that the State action was 
not expropriatory: rather it considered it to be a legitimate exercise of the 
state power to protect cultural inheritance. This does not mean, however, that 
in other cases, these claims have no relevance. Analogously, the prime task of 
the WTO panels and the Appellate Body is ‘to preserve the rights and 
obligations of members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the 
existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules 
of interpretation of public international law…’.109  Therefore, arbitral 
tribunals, WTO panels and the AB cannot adjudicate the land claims of 
indigenous peoples, as these tribunals have no mandate to adjudicate such 
claims.
110
 In the seal products dispute, the defendant referred to the cultural 
entitlements of indigenous peoples.
111
 The Panel and Appellate Body’s 
reports considered the arguments of the claimant and defendant carefully – as 
it is customary.
112
 Yet, the rehearsal of these arguments does not necessarily 
mean that the Panel and the AB endorse them. 
The existence of highly sophisticated dispute settlement mechanisms in 
international economic law risk eclipsing the values of other regimes, such as 
international cultural law, which lack a comparable mechanism. These cases 
show that economic globalization can affect non-economic matters, and that 
international economic fora may not be the most appropriate fora for disputes 
presenting cultural issues. At the institutional level, there seems to be ‘a strict 
separation of powers between the competent international organizations’.113 
The panel and the Appellate Body reports confirm previous jurisprudence on 
the interpretation of the agreements covered by the WTO and do not represent 
a significant departure from the WTO acquis. Very rarely have exceptions 




The relationship between international economic law and other branches of 
international law, including international cultural law, should be addressed in 
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terms of coordination between interrelated systems of public international 
law. Both WTO law and international investment law are public international 
law sub-systems, endowed with relative autonomy, but still open to the 
influence of international law, including international cultural law. It is not a 
question of direct application of international cultural law;
115
 rather 
international economic law fora are called to incidentally evaluate the 
regulatory measures adopted by states to determine whether such measures 
can be justified even if prima facie they appear to be inconsistent with 
provisions of international economic law.   
     
 
V. The Emergence of General Principles of Law Requiring the 
Protection of Cultural Heritage  
  
The governance of cultural heritage can (and has) affect(ed) the economic 
interests of a number of stakeholders, including traders and foreign investors. 
Therefore, trading states and foreign investors have brought a number of 
heritage related claims before the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and 
investment treaty tribunals respectively. This section addresses the question 
as to whether international economic fora are contributing to the coalescence 
of general principles of law requiring the protection of cultural heritage.  
Defined as ‘a core of legal ideas which are common to all legal systems’,116 
general principles of law are a primary source of international law.
117
 The 
Statute of the ICJ empowers the court, if occasion should arise, to apply the 
‘general principles of law recognised by civilised nations’.118 Although the 
Statute applies to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the relevant 
provisions have been deemed to reflect customary international law:
119
 
therefore other international law courts and tribunals have considered general 
principles of law as a source of international law.  
Often considered as a dormant source of international law, general 
principles of law revive and govern a certain issue, if such issue is not 
regulated by treaty law and customary law. Therefore, general principles of 
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law constitute a critical element of international law, helping adjudicators to 
settle a given dispute, filling in the gaps in treaty and customary law and 
allowing international law to evolve and respond to new challenges.
120
 
General principles of law have a flexible, subsidiary and dynamic nature as 
they fill gaps in legal norms, contributing to the development of international 
law. In addition, general principles can be a source of higher law, i.e. jus 
cogens.
121
       
Not only do general principles of law fill the possible gaps left open by 
treaty and custom, but they can also contribute to a dogmatic construction of 
international law as a unitarian legal system. As Cassese put it, general 
principles ‘constitute … the potent cement that binds together the various and 
often disparate cogs and wheels of the normative framework of the 
international community’.122 Some authors contend that ‘it is largely due to 
general principles that international law can be defined a a system’.123 Some 
principles such as pacta sunt servanda provide the foundations of the 
international legal system,
124
 expressing a ‘belief in a universal ratio iuris’ or 
‘common heritage’ of international law,125 and ‘form[ing] the irreducible 
essence of all legal systems’.126  Jeremy Waldron suggests that principles 
expressing ‘a sort of consensus among judges, jurists and lawmakers around 
the world’ constitute a common law of mankind.127 International courts and 
tribunals use general principles of law to reinforce their legal arguments.  
As international courts and tribunals can refer to general principles of law 
even in the absence of general practice (which is an element of customary 
law),
128
 or an express consent of the parties in the form of treaty law, 
arguments have been made that general principles of law amount to an 
external contraint on state behaviour and in fact ‘go beyond legal positivism, 
according to which states are bound by their will only’.129 Yet, if one 
conceives general principles as expressing a common juridical heritage of 
mankind, then rather than representing a delimitation of state autonomy, 
general principles of law constitute its highest expression.
130
 Certainly, the 
identification and application of general principles of law gives significant 
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discretion to international adjudicators. One could argue that in certain cases, 
the determination of legal principles of law has amounted to judicial law-
making,
131
 giving rise to a sort of pretorian law.
132
 
Admittedly the difference between general principles of law and customary 
law is often not clear. General principles are recognized by states but they do 
not require general practice by the same. Custom refers to what is a general 
practice among states and accepted by them as law. In legal terms, panel and 
AB reports as well as awards are not state practice; thus they cannot 
contribute to the emergence of customary international law directly. 
However, state arguments before the WTO and arbitral tribunals and state 
compliance with reports and awards may constitute state practice, thus 
contributing to the emergence of customary rules. Reports and arbitral awards 
can be considered subsidiary means for determining what the law is – in other 
words, if adjudicators have found something to be an international customary 
norm, that ruling can be cited to. Consistent decisions can also prove the 
existence of general principles. 
Given the fact that there are no apposite cultural heritage courts, the 
jurisprudence of international economic courts can and does have an impact 
on cultural governance, and can bridge the gap between different legal 
regimes. For instance, in some cases, arbitral awards have settled disputes 
concerning investments close to world heritage sites referring to the relevant 
UNESCO Convention.
133
 In other cases, arbitrators have settled disputes 
relating to investments in areas valued as sacred by indigenous peoples,
134
 or 
in sectors related to indigenous cultural heritage.
135
 This jurisprudence 
provides some elements from which customary law and/or general principles 
of international law may be detected. These cases open the door to further 
questions about the objectives of international economic law, and the debated 
question of the unity of fragmentation of international law. 
Detecting the eventual emergence of a general principle of international law 
requiring the protection of cultural heritage in times of peace, and the 
equilibrate balancing of interests in such protection, is a theoretical endeavour 
with significant practical outcomes. While some research has been done with 
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regard to the existence of the principle requiring the protection of cultural 
heritage in wartime,
136
 the parallel question as to whether such principle 
exists in times of peace has not received scholarly attention.
137
 Ascertaining 
the existence of general principles and/or customary international law would 
be a significant outcome in that general principles and customary 
international law are binding on states irrespective of their adhesion to 
specific international law treaties and this would facilitate the consideration 
of cultural heritage in the adjudication of transnational disputes.  
Cultural international obligations can be considered by arbitral tribunals 
according to customary rules of treaty interpretation, as restated by Article 
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. These rules 
require arbitral tribunals to take account of other international obligations of 
the parties. In turn, the scrutiny of the relevant cases may help ascertain 
whether the current legal framework provides adequate protection to cultural 
heritage and/or whether amendments may be advisable.  
 While each state retains the right to regulate within its own territory, 
international law poses vertical constraints on such right, ‘introducing global 
interests into the decision-making processes of domestic authorities […]’.138 
Adherence to these international regimes ‘add[s] a circuit of external 
accountability, forcing domestic authorities to consider the interests of the 
wider global constituency affected by their decisions.’139 The review by an 
international tribunal of domestic regulations can improve good cultural 
governance and the transparent pursuit of legitimate cultural policies. 
Cultural governance refers to the need to regulate human activities and their 
implications on cultural heritage so as to protect the cultural interests of 
present and future generations and entails a number of legislative, executive 
and administrative functions. Good cultural governance refers to the exercise 
of state authority according to due process and the rule of law which includes 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
140
 Most governments 
will have to consider the impact of cultural policies on foreign investors and 




 At the same time, the WTO panels, the AB, and arbitral tribunals are not 
to undertake a de novo review of the evidence once brought before the 
national authorities, merely repeating the fact-finding conducted by the 
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latter.
142
 It is not appropriate for these mechanisms to ‘second-guess the 
correctness of the … decision-making of highly specialized national 
regulatory agencies’.143 For instance, in the Glamis Gold Case, the Arbitral 
Tribunal accorded deference to the legislative measures aimed at protecting 
indigenous cultural heritage. The Arbitral Tribunal recognized that: ‘It is not 
the role of this Tribunal or any international tribunal, to supplant its own 
judgment of underlying factual material and support for that of a qualified 
domestic agency’,144 and that ‘governments must compromise between the 
interests of competing parties.’145  
 At the same time, international economic courts scrutinize the given 
national measures to ascertain their compliance with the state international 
economic law obligations. Thus, they are not to pay total deference before 
domestic cultural policies, simply accepting the determinations of the relevant 
national authorities as final. Rather, they assess whether or not the competent 
authorities have complied with their international economic law obligations 
in making their determinations. As one Arbitral Tribunal held, ‘[…] “public 
interest” requires some genuine interest of the public. If mere reference to 
“public interest” can magically [create] such interest and therefore satisfy this 
requirement, then this requirement would be rendered meaningless since the 
Tribunal can imagine no situation where this requirement would not have 
been met.’146 Similarly Wälde and Kolo caution against ‘not so holy alliances 
between protectionist interest and environmental idealism’.147  
 Having said that, the review of cultural heritage related disputes by 
arbitral tribunals and the WTO dispute settlement mechanism may also 
jeopardize the protection of cultural heritage. At best, the protection of 
cultural heritage may be listed among the exceptions in the relevant economic 
treaties and, at worst, it may not be mentioned at all. International economic 
fora do have a limited mandate and may not have adequate expertise to deal 
with cultural heritage. Moreover, good governance can be a patronising 
concept, unless substantive principles of international cultural law are taken 
into account.
148
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 More generally, one may wonder whether the fact that cultural heritage 
disputes are adjudicated before international economic law fora determines a 
sort of institutional bias. With regard to the WTO DSB, ‘it is quite 
uncontroversial that an adjudicatory system engaged in interpreting trade-
liberalizing standards would tend to favor free trade.
149
 Empirical studies 
have also shown that there is a consistently high rate of complainant success 
in WTO dispute resolution
150
 and authors have theorized that ‘the WTO 
panels and the WTO Appellate Body have interpreted the WTO agreements 
in a manner that consistently promotes the goal of expanding trade, often to 
the detriment of respondents’ negotiated and reserved regulatory 
competencies.’151  
     
 
VI.    Towards a Lex Administrativa Culturalis? 
 
Has a lex administrativa culturalis or cultural administrative law 
progressively emerged as a transnational legal order completely autonomous 
from national and international legal orders? And, if so, is this desirable or 
otherwise? The existence of a discrete number of cultural heritage related 
disputes tests the hypothesis of the coalescence of a cultural administrative 
law as an archetype of global administrative law. The expression lex 
administrativa culturalis would refer to a part of transnational law relating to 
the administration of cultural heritage and including the body of 
jurisprudence rendered by economic courts dealing with some aspects of 
cultural heritage.  
The question relates to the more general question as to whether a global 
administrative law is coming into being.
152
 The concept of a global 
administrative law (GAL) or lex administrativa communis
153
 can be defined 
as the coalescence of ‘principles of administrative, comparative and 
international law under different legal systems’.154 Global administrative law 
would include procedural principes such as the rule of law, due process, and 
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Several scholars suggest that global administrative law is coming into 
being.
156
 They highlight that its primary function is that of controlling the 
public power, promoting respect for the rule of law, good governance and 
human rights. According to some authors, investment treaty law and 
arbitration on the one hand and WTO law and adjudication on the other can 
be conceptualized as species of global administrative law and review.
157
 The 
analogy is based on several arguments. First, the WTO panels, the Appellate 
Body and arbitral tribunals have an international/global character, their 
authority deriving from international treaties. Second, international economic 
courts, like administrative courts, settle disputes arising from the exercise of 
public power by state authorities.
158
 These tribunals are given the power to 
review and control such an exercise of public power settling what are 
essentially regulatory disputes. Third, the jurisdiction of these tribunals 
extends to legal disputes.
159
 Finally, panellists, AB Members and arbitrators 
borrow key administrative principles guiding the conduct of public 
administrations such as reasonableness, proportionality, duty to give reasons, 
procedural fairness, efficiency and others, as useful parameters for evaluating 
the conduct of states and assessing their compliance with the relevant treaties.     
Yet, other scholars have argued that not only is ‘a universal set of 
administrative law principles… difficult to identify’, but that it may be 
undesirable.
160
 For instance, according to Harlow, the coalescence of global 
administrative law can have ‘troubling implications for democracy’ because it 
would be ‘made operative through unpublicized trade treaties and 
transnational machinery for dispute resolution’.161 She also contends that the 
GAL project may betray ‘cultural imperialism’, deriving from Western 




More specifically, the conceptualization of the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism and investment treaty arbitration as forms of global 
administrative review may prove to be fragile as ‘the defining features of 
global administrative law are rather fluid’.163 Without a clear understanding 
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of what is meant by global administrative law and review, any attempt to 
classify investment arbitration and the WTO dispute settlement mechanism as 
forms of such review remains a theoretical exercise. There is no such thing as 
a centralized system of administration in international law; rather states retain 
their administrative functions. Furthermore, trade and foreign investments are 
usually governed by a series of norms which are not limited to administrative 
law, but include international treaties, customs, general principles of law. In 
addition, arbitral tribunals have expressly denied being administrative courts. 
For instance, in Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine, the Arbitral Tribunal 
clarified that it was an international tribunal, applying international law to a 
question of international responsibility.
164
 This questions the idea of a global 
administrative law.
165
 Finally, the use of the arbitration model and the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism is aimed at depoliticizing disputes, avoiding 
potential national court bias and/or unilateral sanctions and ensuring the 
advantages of effective, impartial and legal dispute settlement mechanisms.
166
  
Drawing from the previous analysis, one might conclude that international 
investment arbitration and the WTO dispute settlement mechanism present 
some elements of global administrative review (i.e., review of administrative 
acts), but that they also lack some of its features (at the end of the day the 
administrative acts which are under review belong to the national sphere).
167
 
     
     
 Conclusions  
 
The linkage between cultural governance and international economic law has 
increasingly come to the fore. At the substantive level, international economic 
law provides an extensive protection to investors’ and trading nations’ rights 
in order to encourage foreign direct investment and free trade. A potential 
tension exists when a state adopts cultural policies interfering with foreign 
investments and free trade, as this may breach international trade and 
investment law provisions. Therefore, foreign investors and trading nations 
can seek compensation for the impact of such regulation on their economic 
interests. Because international cultural treaties do not include compulsory 
dispute settlement mechanisms, cultural heritage related disputes have 
gravitated towards international economic ‘courts’. The magnetism of the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism and arbitral tribunals has been a mixed 
blessing.  
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On the one hand, cultural heritage related economic disputes put cultural 
governance to a test, in that they show its (lack of) dedicated heritage courts 
and tribunals. Concerns remain with regard to the effectiveness of cultural 
governance, as international economic fora have a limited mandate and 
cannot adjudicate on the eventual violation of international cultural law. 
There is a risk that investment treaty tribunals, WTO panels and the Appellate 
Body dilute or neglect significant cultural aspects, eventually emphasizing 
economic interests. These tribunals may not constitute the ideal fora for 
settling cultural heritage related disputes. Arbitral tribunals and the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism lack of institutional and/or procedural 
connection with other international institutions such as UNESCO and have 
limited jurisdiction. The institutional structure of the WTO and the ICSID, 
their processes and the outcomes they sanction are far from what would be 
required of a body to which cultural heritage authority could be entrusted. 
Trade law and investment law should not be used to enforce cultural heritage 
law.
168
 This is not to say that arbitral tribunals and the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism can avoid dealing with cultural heritage in some 
instances or that they are failing to properly account for cultural heritage 
issues. From a legal perspective, the debate on the unity or fragmentation of 
international law has fostered an increasing awareness that there are no self-
contained regimes in international law. The Appellate Body clarified that 
GATT ‘is not to be read in clinical isolation from public international law’.169 
And the same is surely the case as regards international investment law.
170
 
Rather customary rules of treaty interpretation, as restated by Article 31(3)(c) 
of the VCLT, bridge the gap between different legal spaces. Other 
interpretive criteria, such as the lex posterior and lex specialis rules can also 
offer additional tools for connecting different subsystems of international law, 
albeit a mechanical use of these criteria should be avoided, as different 
branches of international law have different aims and objectives and they do 
not completely overlap. Some arbitral tribunals have shown a sensitive 
approach to cultural issues, holding that cultural concerns can constitute a 
legitimate distinction rather than discrimination, or taking cultural elements 
into account in their interpretation of international economic law. The 
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pathways of separate subsets of international law are increasingly 
intersecting.  
On the other hand, the review of domestic regulations by international 
tribunals can improve good governance and the transparent pursuit of 
legitimate cultural policies. The WTO dispute settlement mechanism and 
arbitral tribunals are imposing schemes of good governance by requiring the 
respect of international economic law provisions — including the prohibition 
of discrimination — and by adopting general principles of law, such as due 
process. The scrutiny of arbitral tribunals can be in line with good cultural 
governance as demanded by the relevant UNESCO instruments in that 
unrestricted state sovereignty may – and in some cases does – jeopardize the 
protection of cultural heritage and/or individual entitlements. In fact, 
requirements such as due process, proportionality and reasonableness can 
contribute albeit indirectly to the protection of cultural heritage and ensure an 
appropriate balance between public and private interest. Although these 
requirements are not per se specific to the cultural field but are equally 
applicable in adjudications relating to other fields such as environmental 
protection, public health, and other, their application to the cultural field help 
shaping cultural heritage law. 
Arbitral tribunals and the WTO dispute settlement mechanism can 
contribute to the emergence of general principles of law requiring the 
protection of cultural heritage in times of peace. They require that a suitable 
balance be struck between public and private interests. This jurisprudence can 
reverberate beyond the four corners of international economic law, 
influencing other international courts and tribunals and even rule-makers. 
More importantly, this jurisprudence can contribute to the development of 
common legal principles requiring the protection of cultural heritage and the 
respect of principles such as legality, fairness and good faith in cultural 
governance as well as the prohibition of discriminatory, arbitrary, or 
unreasonable measures. 
The article also discussed the questions of whether international economic 
law is a form of global administrative law and whether the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism and investment arbitration are forms of the same. GAL 
remains, itself, a contested concept that is difficult to pin down. This makes it 
more difficult to rely on it as a way to conceptualize international economic 
law in general or international economic law as it relates to cultural heritage. 
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism and investment arbitration have 
some elements of global administrative review, but not all elements one 
might look for. Whether these developments have given rise to a cultural 
administrative law, remains open to debate. This is even more so, in light of 
the lively controversy as to whether GAL might be useful or rather – as 
Harlow suggests – affect cultural diversity. 
Certainly, by taking elements of cultural heritage law into account, state 
practice in compliance with the relevant reports and arbitral awards can 
contribute to the emergence of general principles of law requiring the 
protection of cultural heritage and an equilibrate balance between the public 
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and private interests. This outcome would be notable because states are bound 
by general principles of law irrespective of their consent. This would 
facilitate the consideration of cultural concerns in future adjudication of 
analogous disputes.      
